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Abstract. We consider a nonatomic selfish routing model with independent stochastic travel times, represented by
mean and variance latency functions for each edge that depend on their flows. In an effort to decouple the effect of
risk-averse player preferences from selfish behavior on the degradation of system performance, Nikolova and Stier-
Moses [16] defined the concept of the price of risk aversion as the worst-case ratio of the cost of an equilibrium with
risk-averse players (who seek risk-minimizing paths, for an appropriate definition of risk) and that of an equilibrium
with risk-neutral users (who minimize the mean travel time of a path). For risk-averse users who seek to minimize
the mean plus variance of travel time on a path, they proved an upper bound on the price of risk aversion, which is
independent of the mean and variance latency functions, and grows linearly with the size of the graph and players’
risk-aversion.
In this follow-up paper, we provide a matching lower bound for graphs with number of vertices equal to powers
of two, via the construction of a graph family inductively generated from the Braess graph. In contrast to these
topological bounds that depend on the topology of the network, we also provide conceptually different bounds,
which we call functional. These bounds depend on the class of mean latency functions that are allowed and provide
characterizations that are independent of the network topology. The functional upper bound was first derived by
Meir and Parkes [10] in a different context with different techniques; we offer a simpler, direct proof that is inspired
by a classic proof technique using variational inequalities [7]. We also supplement the upper bound with a new
asymptotically-tight lower bound, derived from the same graph construction as the topological lower bound. Thus,
we offer a conceptually new perspective and understanding of both this and classic congestion game settings in
terms of the functional versus topological view of efficiency loss.
Our third contribution is a tight bound on the price of risk aversion for a family of graphs that generalize series-
parallel graphs and the Braess graph. That bound applies to both users minimizing the mean plus variance (mean-
var) of a path, as well as to users minimizing the mean plus standard deviation (mean-stdev) of a path—a much more
complex model of risk-aversion due to the cost of a path being non-additive over edge costs. This is a refinement
of previous results in [16] that characterized the price of risk-aversion for series-parallel graphs and for the Braess
graph. The main question left open is to upper bound the price of risk-aversion in the mean-stdev model for general
graphs; our lower bounds apply to both the mean-var and the mean-stdev models.
1 Introduction
One of the key challenges of making optimal routing decisions is the phenomenon of congestion: the fact that the
travel time along a link increases with the number of users on that link. Thus, a user deciding on her optimal route
needs to take into account the routing decisions of other users in the network. Networks subject to congestion lead to
significant tensions between the local goals of users to minimize their travel times and the global goal of the network
planner to minimize the total travel time of all users. The challenge was investigated in the early work of Wardrop [23]
and Beckmann et al. [2] by formalizing congestion effects into a game theoretic model of routing and by defining and
analyzing the traffic assignments or flows resulting from the two conflicting goals, known as the Wardrop equilibrium
and the social optimum, respectively.
The desire to understand and precisely quantify the severity of the tension between equilibrium and social optimum,
or, in other words, to quantify the degradation of system performance due to selfish behavior, inspired the definition
of the price of anarchy, which, informally speaking, measures equilibrium inefficiency relative to a socially-optimal
solution. Consequently, routing games have been central to the development of algorithmic game theory and have
inspired the intensive study of the price of anarchy in many settings with incentives beyond routing. At the same time,
routing games continue to be a rich source of new research questions driven by the need to add realism to network
models and to improve real-life applications.
Indeed, routing is fundamental to diverse applications affecting everyday life including transportation, telecom-
munication networks, robotics, task planning, etc. All of these applications suffer inherent uncertainty in the network
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parameters such as travel times and demands, which can significantly alter individual routing choices and completely
throw off a predicted equilibrium solution and its efficiency, due to players’ risk aversion. For example, Piliouras et al.
[20] illustrate that the price of anarchy results are extremely sensitive to the modeling of risk-averse preferences and
show that the price of anarchy may in some models decrease while in others become unbounded.
Incorporating risk-aversion in routing games is particularly challenging in general due to the often nonlinear nature
of risk attitudes. For example, even finding a best response, which is a minimum-risk path according to some appropri-
ate definition of risk, may lead to an algorithmic problem of unknown complexity that we currently do not know how
to solve in polynomial time [17, 18, 12]. On the other hand, even for simpler risk-averse objectives that are additive
and algorithmically tractable, understanding the effect of risk on equilibrium inefficiency may require fundamentally
different techniques from the ones used so far to analyze the price of anarchy [16].
There has been an increased effort in recent years to model risk-averse preferences in routing games and understand
the effect of such player preferences on network equilibria [19, 13, 11, 1, 20, 15, 16, 5]. We follow the mean-variance
risk model considered by Nikolova and Stier-Moses [16] as well as the mean-stdev model considered there and in
their previous work [15]. Risk-averse agents are postulated to minimize a linear combination of the mean and variance
of a path, or the mean and standard deviation of a path, respectively. We defer the reader to this earlier work for the
motivation and criticisms of these models of risk-aversion in network settings.
In an effort to decouple the effect of risk attitudes from the effect of selfish behavior on the degradation of system
performance, Nikolova and Stier-Moses [16] defined the concept of price of risk aversion (PRA) as the worst-case
ratio of the cost of a risk-averse equilibrium to that of a risk-neutral equilibrium (namely, the equilibria when agents
are risk-averse and risk-neutral, respectively). The main result in their paper was an upper bound on the price of risk
aversion in general graphs that is linear in the number of vertices of the graph. Specifically, the bound was shown
to be 1 + κγn/2, where κ is the worst-case variance-to-mean ratio of an edge at equilibrium, γ is the coefficient of
risk-aversion and n is the number of vertices in the graph.
Our contribution In this follow-up paper to Nikolova and Stier-Moses [16], we provide a tight lower bound to the
price of risk aversion, matching 1 + κγn/2, through the construction of a graph family with number of vertices that
are powers of two (Theorem 3). Whereas the upper bound on the price of risk-aversion was established for general
graphs only in the mean-variance model and was left open for the mean-stdev model, the lower bound provided here
applies to both models. The upper bound was based on establishing the existence of an alternating s-t-path consisting
of forward and backward edges for which equilibria satisfy a certain property, and seeing that the alternating path can
have at most n/2 alternations. Constructing the worst-case family presented in this paper involves finding an instance
in which the alternating path goes through every vertex in the graph and alternates between forward and backward
edges at every internal vertex. We achieve this by inductively defining a graph family with appropriate mean and
variance functions for each edge, using the topology of the Braess graph.
A key feature of these upper and lower bounds to the price of risk-aversion is that they are independent of latency
functions, though highly dependent on the topology of the graph. We call these results topological, as opposed to
the functional nature of existing price of anarchy results, which quantify the price of anarchy in terms of the class
of allowed latency functions and which provide bounds independent of the network topology [21, 6]. For example,
the famous price of anarchy bound of 4/3 holds for linear latency functions and arbitrary graph topologies, and it
is unbounded for arbitrary latency functions. In contrast, the price of risk aversion upper bound of Nikolova and
Stier-Moses [16], as well as our lower bounds, depend on the network topology and are independent of the latency
functions.
Our second contribution bridges this topological vs. functional view of equilibrium inefficiency, by developing an
asymptotically-tight functional bound for the mean-variance model. This new bound depends on the class of allowed
latency functions and is independent of the network topology, as with the classic price of anarchy results. In particular,
using a variational inequality characterization of equilibria proposed by Correa et al. [6], we show that the price of
risk aversion is upper bounded by (1 + κγ)(1− µ)−1 for (1, µ)-smooth latency functions (Theorem 4). This implies,
for example, that the price of risk aversion is at most (1 + κγ)4/3 for linear latency functions. The upper bound can
be thought as a generalization of the classic result of [21] that established that the price of anarchy equals (1 − µ)−1
because when there is no variability κ = 0. Furthermore, we show that our bound is asymptotically tight by providing
a matching lower bound (Theorem 5). We note that the upper bound was proved using different techniques and in a
slightly different context, by Meir and Parkes [10]; we provide more details in the related work section below. Finally,
we remark that for unrestricted functions, the functional upper bounds become vacuous since µ = 1, which provides
further support for the topological analysis of Section 3.
Finally, our third contribution provides a tight bound on the price of risk aversion under the mean-stdev model for
a family of graphs that generalizes series-parallel graphs (specifically, the family of graphs where the domino-with-
ears graph, shown in Fig. 5(b), is a forbidden minor). The mean-stdev model is significantly more difficult to analyze
than the mean-var model due to its non-additive nature, namely the mean plus standard deviation of a path cannot be
decomposed as a sum of costs over the edges in the path. Nikolova and Stier-Moses [16] proved that the price of risk
aversion in this model is 1 + γκ for series-parallel graphs, or equivalently the family of instances where the Braess
graph is a forbidden minor. The proof is based on establishing that this family of graphs admits an alternating path
with zero alternations, namely an alternating path with forward edges only. En route to establishing a more general
bound, in this paper we extend the analysis to a larger family of graphs that generalizes series-parallel graphs, and
show that this family admits alternating paths with one alternation and thus has a price of risk aversion of 1 + 2κγ.
We remark that this bound applies to the mean-var model as well, and it refines our understanding on the topology of
graphs for which the price of risk aversion is 1 + 2κγ, as opposed to the cruder bound in terms of number of vertices
only.
An intriguing conjecture that we leave open is to show a bound for the mean-stdev model for general graphs that
is equivalent to the corresponding bound for the mean-var model, namely that the price of risk aversion is at most
1 + γκη, where η is the number of forward subpaths in an alternating path and κ is the maximum coefficient of
variation of edge latencies at the equilibrium flow. Intuitively, the mean plus standard deviation along a path is upper
bounded by the corresponding mean plus variance. It is appealing to think that, as a result, the cost of the mean-stdev
risk-averse equilibrium should be upper bounded by that of the mean-var risk-averse equilibrium. A corollary of such a
bound, combined with our first contribution here, would be an asymptotically-tight bound on the price of risk aversion
equal to 1 + γκn/2 for the mean-stdev model in general graphs.
Related Work The most closely related work to ours is that of Nikolova and Stier-Moses [16], who define the con-
cept of price of risk aversion as the worst-case ratio of the cost of a risk-averse equilibrium to that of a risk-neutral
equilibrium. For users that seek to minimize the mean plus γ times the variance of a path, where γ is a given constant
that parameterizes the degree of risk-aversion, they show that the price of risk-aversion in general networks is upper
bounded by 1 + κγη, where η is a parameter that depends on the graph topology and κ is the maximum variance-to-
mean ratio. The remarkable feature of that bound is that it is independent of the mean and variance latency functions.
The proof is based on establishing the existence of an alternating s-t path of forward and backward edges, in which
the forward edges carry more risk-neutral flow and the backward edges carry more risk-averse flow. A question left
open by them is whether this bound is tight, which is what we prove here. In addition, for both the mean-variance
and the mean-stdev model, Nikolova and Stier-Moses proved a tight bound of the price of risk-aversion of 1 + κγ
for series-parallel graphs. Here, we extend this characterization to a tight bound of 1 + 2κγ for a wider family of
graphs, namely those where the domino-with-ears graph is a forbidden minor. Finally, in contrast to this earlier work,
which only provides results depending on the graph topology, here we additionally offer functional bounds that are
independent of the network topology and instead are parametrized by the class of allowed latency functions.
The asymptotically-tight functional bounds we present here were inspired by the recent work of Meir and Parkes
[10]. In their paper, they prove a result that compares an equilibrium when players consider a modified cost function
to the social optimum of the original game. As a corollary, they indirectly derive an upper bound on the price of
risk aversion of (1 + κγ)(1 − µ)−1 when cost functions are (1, µ) smooth. As we establish in this paper, this upper
bound and that of Nikolova and Stier-Moses [16] are of a different type, i.e., functional vs. topological, which is why
they cannot be compared directly. Our proof of the upper bound relies on a simpler approach that is a straightforward
generalization of the earlier price of anarchy proof based on variational inequalities put forward by [7]. Consequently,
the method allows for an easier comparison and consistency with the traditional price of anarchy proofs. We also
provide an asymptotically-matching functional lower bound, which follows from the same graph construction as our
topological lower bound.
Finally, we mention again that this paper is part of a relatively new and growing literature exploring the effect of
risk aversion on network equilibria in routing games [19, 13, 11, 1, 20, 15, 16, 5]. We refer the reader to the recent
paper by Nikolova and Stier-Moses [16] for a more comprehensive review of additional related work, as well as a
detailed discussion on the pros and cons of the risk-averse models considered here. We also refer the reader to the
recent survey by Cominetti [4] for a more extensive review of equilibrium routing under uncertainty.
2 The Model
We consider a directed graph G = (V,E) with a single source-sink pair (s, t) and an aggregate demand of d units
of flow that need to be routed from s to t. We let P be the set of all feasible paths between s and t. We encode
the decisions of the symmetric players as a flow vector f = (fp)p∈P ∈ R|P|+ over all paths. Such a flow is feasible
when demand is satisfied, as given by the constraint
∑
p∈P fp = d. For notational simplicity, we denote the flow on
a directed edge e by fe =
∑
p3e fp. When we need multiple flow variables, we use the analogous notation x, xp, xe
and z, zp, ze.
The network is subject to congestion, modeled with stochastic delay functions `e(fe) + ξe(fe) for each edge
e ∈ E. Here, the deterministic function `e(fe) measures the expected delay when the edge has flow fe, and ξe(fe)
is a random variable that represents a noise term on the delay, encoding the error that `e(·) makes. Functions `e(·),
generally referred to as latency functions, are assumed continuous and non-decreasing. The expected latency along a
path p is given by `p(f) :=
∑
e∈p `e(fe).
Random variables ξe(fe) have expectation equal to zero and standard deviation equal to σe(fe), for arbitrary
continuous functions σe(·). For the variational inequality characterization used in Section 4, we further assume that
standard deviation functions are non-decreasing. We assume that these random variables are pairwise independent.
From there, the variance along a path equals vp(f) =
∑
e∈p σ
2
e(fe), and the standard deviation (stdev) is σp(f) =
(vp(f))
1/2. We will initially work with variances and then extend the model to standard deviations, which have the
complicating square roots. (For details on the complications, we refer the reader to [15, 16]).
We will consider the nonatomic version of the routing game where infinitely many players control an infinitesimal
amount of flow each so that the path choice of a single player does not unilaterally affect the costs experienced by
other players (even though the joint actions of players affect other players).
Players are risk-averse and choose paths taking into account the variability of delays by considering a mean-var
objective Qγp(f) = `p(f) + γvp(f). We refer to this objective simply as the path cost (as opposed to latency). Here,
γ ≥ 0 is a constant that quantifies the risk-aversion of the players, which we assume homogeneous. The special case
of γ = 0 corresponds to risk-neutrality.
The variability of delays is usually not too large with respect to the expected latency. It is common to consider the
coefficient of variation CVe(fe) := σe(fe)/`e(fe) given by the ratio of the standard deviation to the expectation as
a relative measure of variability [9]. In this case, we consider the variance-to-mean ratio ve(fe)/`e(fe) as a relative
measure of variability. Consequently, we assume that ve(xe)/`e(xe) is bounded from above by a fixed constant κ for
all e ∈ E at the equilibrium flow of interest xe ∈ R+, which is less restrictive than requiring such a bound for all
feasible flows. This means that the variance cannot be larger than κ times the expected latency in any edge at the
equilibrium flow.
In summary, an instance of the problem is given by the tuple (G, d, `, v, γ), which represents the topology, the
demand, the latency functions, the variability functions, and the degree of player risk-aversion.
The following definition captures that at equilibrium players route flow along paths with minimum cost Qγp(·). In
essence, users will switch routes until at equilibrium costs are equal along all used paths. This is the natural extension
of the traditional Wardrop Equilibrium to risk-averse users.
Definition 1 (Equilibrium). A γ-equilibrium of a stochastic nonatomic routing game is a flow f such that for every
path p ∈ P with positive flow, the path cost Qγp(f) ≤ Qγq (f) for any other path q ∈ P . For a fixed risk-aversion
parameter γ, we refer to a γ-equilibrium as a risk-averse Wardrop equilibrium (RAWE), denoted by x.
Notice that since the variance decomposes as a sum over all the edges that form the path, the previous definition
represents a standard Wardrop equilibrium with respect to modified costs `e(fe) + γve(fe). For the existence of the
equilibrium, it is sufficient that the modified cost functions are increasing.
Our goal is to investigate the effect that risk-averse players have on the quality of equilibria. The quality of a
solution that represents collective decisions can be quantified by the cost of equilibria with respect to expected delays
since, over time, different realizations of delays average out to the mean by the law of large numbers. For this reason,
a social planner, who is concerned about the long term, is typically risk neutral, as opposed to users who tend to
be more emotional about decisions. Furthermore, the social planner may aim to reduce long-term emissions, which
would be better captured by the total expected delay of all users. These arguments justify the difference between the
risk aversion coefficient that characterizes user behavior at equilibrium and the behavior of the social planner.
Definition 2. The social cost of a flow f is defined as the sum of the expected latencies of all players: C(f) :=∑
p∈P fp`p(f) =
∑
e∈E fe`e(fe) .
Although one could have measured total cost as the weighted sum of the costs Qγp(f) of all users, this captures
users’ utilities but not the system’s benefit. Nikolova and Stier-Moses [15] considered such a cost function to compute
the price of anarchy; in the current paper, our goal is to compare across different values of risk aversion so we want
the various flow costs to be measured with the same units.
The next definition captures the increase in social cost at equilibrium introduced by user risk-aversion, compared
to the cost one would have if users were risk-neutral. Hence, we use a risk-neutral Wardrop equilibrium (RNWE),
defined as a 0-equilibrium according to Definition 1, as the yardstick to determine the inefficiency caused by risk-
aversion. We define the price of risk aversion as the worst-case ratio among all possible instances of expected costs of
the risk-averse and risk-neutral equilibria.
Definition 3 ([16]). Considering an instance family F of a routing game with uncertain delays, the price of risk
aversion (PRA) associated with γκ (the risk-aversion coefficient times the variance-to-mean ratio) is defined by
PRA(F , γ, κ) := sup
G,d,`,v
{
C(x)
C(z)
: (G, d, `, v) ∈ F and v(x) ≤ κ`(x)
}
, (1)
where x and z are the RAWE and the RNWE of the corresponding instance.
This supremum depends on F , which may be defined in terms of the network topology (as, e.g., general, series-
parallel, or Braess networks), the number of vertices, or the set of allowed latency functions (as, e.g., affine or quadratic
polynomials). Different results will be with respect to different families F , with Sections 3 and 5 focusing on topo-
logical definitions, and Section 4 focusing on sets of allowed functions. For the sake of brevity, we will typically write
just PRA and the parameters F , γ, and κ will be implicit by the context. Although we do not specify it explicitly in
each result for brevity, all our results work for arbitrary values of γ ≥ 0 and κ ≥ 0.
3 Structural Lower Bounds for the Price of Risk Aversion
In this section, we prove two lower bounds on the price of risk aversion PRA, both matching the upper bounds
presented by Nikolova and Stier-Moses [16]. The first bound for PRA is with respect to the minimum number of
alternations among all alternating paths as defined below, while the second bound is with respect to the number of
vertices in the graph. In fact, the same bounds hold in the mean-standard deviation model, but we defer that discussion
to Section 5.
Given an instance, we denote a RNWE flow associated with it by z, and a RAWE flow by x. To define alternating
paths, we partition the edge-set E into A = {e ∈ E : xe < ze} and B = {e ∈ E : ze ≤ xe}. Conceptually,
an alternating path is an s-t-path in the graph where edges in B are reversed (see Fig. 5(c) for an illustration of the
definition).
Definition 4 ([16]). A generalized path pi = A1-B1-A2-B2-· · · -At-Bt-At+1, composed of a sequence of subpaths, is
an alternating path when every edge in Ai ⊆ E is directed in the direction of the path, and every edge in Bi ⊂ E is
directed in the opposite direction from the path. We say that such a path has t + 1 disjoint forward subpaths, and t
alternations.
The definition of alternating paths was motivated by the following result.
Theorem 1 ([16]). Considering the set of instances with arbitrary mean and variance latency functions that admit an
alternating path with up to η disjoint forward subpaths, PRA ≤ 1 + ηγκ.
The theorem implies that for the set of instances on graphs with n vertices, PRA ≤ 1 + γκdn−12 e since in that
case an alternating path cannot have more than d(n−1)/2e disjoint forward subpaths. We are going to prove that those
upper bounds are tight. To get there, we first prove a more general result that shows how instances with high price of
risk aversion can be constructed.
Theorem 2. For an i ∈ N>0, consider riA, riN ∈ R≥0 such that 2iriA > (2i − 1)riN . There exists an instance based
on a graph Gi(riA, r
i
N ) that satisfies the following two properties.
– If riA risk-averse players are routed through Gi(riA, riN ), then the path cost along used paths at the RAWE flow x,
as well as the expected latency, is 1 + 2iγκ. The social cost is C(x) = (1 + 2iγκ)riA.
Fig. 1. The base case G1(r1A, r1N ) is a Braess graph.
– If riN risk-neutral players are routed through Gi(riA, riN ), then the expected latency along each used path at the
RNWE flow z is 1. The social cost is C(z) = riN .
The proof is by induction on i. We will recursively construct the instance for i by forming a Braess instance with
the graph resulting for the i−1 case. At each step we will need to find a mean latency function that makes the properties
in the statement work.
Proof. For the base case i = 1, we let G1(r1A, r
1
N ) be the Braess graph, shown in Fig. 1. Indeed, consider any r
1
A, r
1
N
such that r1A > r
1
N/2 as indicated in the statement of the result. We define the mean latency function a1(x) to be any
function that is strictly increasing for x ≥ r1N/2 and such that a1(r1N/2) = 0 and a1(r1A) = γκ. Note that in order for
a1(x) to be strictly increasing, it is necessary that r1A > r
1
N/2, which holds by hypothesis.
The RAWE flow x routes the r1A risk-averse players along the zig-zag path. Hence, the mean-var objective in the
upper-left and the lower-right edges, as well as the mean latency, will each be γκ, totalling 1 + 2γκ for each player in
both cases. Hence, C(x) = (1 + 2iγκ)riA. Instead, the RNWE flow z routes the r
1
N risk-neutral players along the top
and bottom paths, half and half. Hence, the cost for each player is 1 and C(z) = riN , proving the base case.
Let us consider the inductive step where we assume we have an instance satisfying the properties for i − 1 and
construct the instance for step i. Starting from riA and r
i
N satisfying the condition in the statement for case i, we
set ri−1A = (2
iriA − riN )/2i+1 and ri−1N = riN/2. We first verify that these values satisfy the hypothesis for the
case i − 1. Indeed, ri−1A > 2
i−1−1
2i−1 r
i−1
N because by hypothesis r
i
A >
2i−1
2i r
i
N ⇔ r
i
A
2 >
2i−1
2i+1 r
i
N which implies that
riA
2 − r
i
N
2i+1 >
2i−1
2i+1 r
i
N − 12i+1 riN = 2
i−1−1
2i−1
riN
2 .
Using the graph corresponding to step i − 1 and the values of ri−1A and ri−1N specified previously, we construct
graph Gi(riA, r
i
N ) with those components as shown in Fig. 2. We define the mean latency function ai(x) to be any
function that is strictly increasing for x ≥ riN/2 and such that a1(riN/2) = 0 and ai( r
i
A
2 +
riN
2i+1 ) = 2
i−1γκ. Note
that in order for ai(x) to be strictly increasing, it is necessary that
riA
2 +
riN
2i+1 >
riN
2 , which actually holds because, by
hypothesis, riA >
2i−1
2i r
i
N ⇔ r
i
A
2 >
2i−1
2i+1 r
i
N .
The RAWE flow x routes the riA risk-averse players as follows:
riA
2 − r
i
N
2i+1 units along the upper path,
riN
2i units
along the zig-zag path, and r
i
A
2 − r
i
N
2i+1 units along the lower path. The mean-var objective of the upper-left and the
lower-right edges, as well as the mean latency, will each be 2i−1γκ since the flow through them is equal to r
i
A
2 +
riN
2i+1 .
The flow inside each of the copies of Gi−1(ri−1A , r
i−1
N ) is a RAWE for which we know, by induction, that all players
perceive a path cost of 1 + 2i−1γκ, which additionally, by induction, is the mean latency of all used paths. Thus, the
path cost that players perceive in Gi(riA, r
i
N ) under the RAWE flow x is 1 + 2
iγκ, which additionally is the mean
latency of all used paths, and the social cost is C(x) = (1 + 2iγκ)riA.
The RNWE flow z routes the riN risk-neutral players along the top and bottom paths, half and half. Hence, the
path cost for perceived by each player is 1, as the mean-var objective in the upper-left and lower-right edges is equal
to 0, and, by induction, passing through either of both copies of Gi−1(ri−1A , r
i−1
N ) has a mean-var objective of 1. This
implies that C(z) = riN , which completes the proof. uunionsq
The previous result provides a constructive way to generate instances with high price of risk aversion. We show
the concrete topology for the cases i = 2 and i = 3 in Fig. 3 below. Notice that the paths of the instances resulting
from these constructions have at most one edge with non-zero variance. This fact is useful to extend our lower bounds
to the mean-stdev model, since in that case summing and taking square roots is not needed.
Fig. 2. The recursive construction of Gi(riA, riN ) by forming a Braess graph topology using components of the earlier step.
Another useful observation is that the prevailing value for mean latency functions aj under the RNWE flow z is
0, and under the RAWE flow x is 2j−1. This can be easily proved by induction and will be used when establishing
functional lower bounds on the PRA in the next section.
We now use the previous result to get lower bounds for PRA matching the upper bound specified earlier.
Corollary 1. For any n0 ∈ N, there is an instance on a graph G with n ≥ n0 vertices such that its equilibria satisfy
C(x) ≥ 1 + γκd(n− 1)/2eC(z).
Proof. Consider an arbitrary demand d, and apply Theorem 2 with riA = r
i
N = d and i = min{j ∈ N : n0 ≤ 2j} to
get instance Gi(riA, r
i
N ). Consequently, the RAWE flow x and the RNWE flow z satisfy that
C(x)
C(z)
=
(1 + 2iγκ)d
d
= 1 + γκ
n
2
,
because Gi(riA, r
i
N ) has 2
i+1 vertices by construction. Finally, the result holds because n is a power of two. uunionsq
The previous lower bound together with the upper bound given in the paragraph after Theorem 1 imply that the
PRA with respect to the set of instances on graphs with up to n vertices is exactly equal to 1 + γκd(n− 1)/2e when
n is a power of 2. From there, the bound is tight infinitely often. Although for other values of n the bounds are not
tight, they are close together so these results provide an understanding of the asymptotic growth of the PRA. We now
refine this observation to the bound in Theorem 1.
Theorem 3. The upper bound for the price of risk-aversion shown in Theorem 1 and the lower bound shown in
Corollary 1 coincide for graphs of size that is a power of 2. Otherwise, the gap between them is less than 2.
Proof. For an arbitrary i > 1, we consider the instance with 2i+1 = 2η vertices constructed in Corollary 1. In that
instance, the only alternating path has exactly 2i = η disjoint forward subpaths. Indeed, using Fig. 3 as an example
of the representation of the graph, we define an alternating path by recursively choosing the lower component, next
the reverse vertical edge, and last recursively choosing the upper component. By expanding both recursions, it is not
hard to see that the alternating path covers all 2η vertices, and its η non-vertical edges are disjoint forward subpaths, as
required. According to the equilibrium flows computed in Corollary 1, the non-vertical edges in the alternating paths
belong to A, while the rest of the edges belong to B. Hence, the alternating path is compatible with the definitions of
A and B, as required.
For graph sizes n that are not a power of 2, there is a rounding error. For the lower bound, we need to consider the
maximum power of 2 smaller than n. The relative gap satisfies
UB
LB
≤ 1 + γκd(n− 1)/2e
1 + γκ2blog2(n))c
< 2 .
uunionsq
In conclusion, PRA = 1+ηγκ when the family of instances is defined as graphs with arbitrary mean and variance
functions that admit alternating paths with up to η disjoint forward subpaths, for η equal to a power of 2. We have
equality because the supremum in the definition of PRA is attained by the instance constructed previously.
4 Functional Bounds
In this section, we turn our attention to instances with mean latency functions restricted to be in a certain family (as,
e.g., affine functions). We prove upper and lower bounds for the PRA that are asymptotically tight as γκ increases.
The results rely on the variational inequality approach that was first used by [7] to prove price of anarchy (POA)
bounds for fixed families of functions. This approach was based on the properties of the allowed functions. Since then,
these properties have been successively refined by [8, 22], and they are now usually referred to as the local smoothness
property. Although not really needed for the results here, we use the latter terminology since it has become standard
by now. To characterize a family of mean latency functions, we rely on the smoothness property, defined below.
Definition 5 ([22]). A function ` : R≥0 → R≥0 is said to be (λ, µ)-smooth around x ∈ R≥0 if y`(x) ≤ λy`(y) +
µx`(x) for all y ∈ R≥0.
Using the previous definition, we construct an upper bound for the PRA when mean latency functions {`e}e∈E
are (1, µ)-smooth around the RAWE flow xe for all edges e ∈ E. Meir and Parkes [10] proved a similar bound using
a related approach in which they generalize the smoothness definition to biased smoothness which holds with respect
to a modified latency function. In our case, the modified latency function would be `e + γve. One advantage of our
approach is its simplicity; it is a straightforward generalization of the POA proof given in [7]. Also, we only require
smoothness around the equilibrium flows, while the biased smoothness of [10] requires the property for all x ∈ R≥0.
We provide a proof corresponding to our assumptions, matching what is needed to get our asymptotically-tight lower
bounds.
Theorem 4. Consider the set of general instances with mean latency functions {`e}e∈E that are (1, µ)-smooth around
any RAWE flow xe for all e ∈ E. 3 Then, with respect to that set of instances,
PRA ≤ (1 + γκ) 1
1− µ.
Proof. We consider an instance within the family, a corresponding RAWE flow x, and a RNWE flow z. Further, we
let A = {e ∈ E|xe < ze} and B = {e ∈ E|ze ≤ xe}. Using a variational inequality formulation for the RAWE [15],
we have that ∑
e∈E
xe(`e(xe) + γve(xe)) ≤
∑
e∈E
ze(`e(xe) + γve(xe)) .
Partitioning the sum over E at both sides into terms for A and B, subtracting the following inequality∑
e∈A
xeve(xe) +
∑
e∈B
xeve(xe) ≥
∑
e∈B
zeve(xe) (2)
from it, and further bounding ve(xe) by κ`e(xe), we get that
C(x) =
∑
e∈A
xe`e(xe) +
∑
e∈B
xe`e(xe) ≤
∑
e∈A
(1 + γκ)ze`e(xe) +
∑
e∈B
ze`e(xe).
Inequality (2) follows from the non-negativeness of the flow and the variance, and from the definition of B. Applying
the definition of A to the first term in the right-hand side of the last inequality and the (1, µ)-smoothness condition to
the second term, we upper bound the cost and the result follows.
C(x) ≤
∑
e∈A
(1 + γκ)ze`e(ze) +
∑
e∈B
(ze`e(ze) + µxe`e(xe)) ≤ (1 + γκ)C(z) + µC(x).
uunionsq
3 If the instance admits multiple equilibria, we require smoothness around all of the corresponding flows.
Fig. 3. The resulting graphs Gi for i = 1 on the left, and i = 2 on the right. Edges labeled with aj have the mean latency function
with equal name and 0 variance. Vertical edges have mean latency functions equal to 1 and variance equal to 0. Finally, the rest of
the edges have mean latency functions equal to 1 and variance equal to κ.
The bound in the previous result is similar to that for the POA for nonatomic games with no uncertainty. Indeed,
the result there is that POA ≤ (1 − µ)−1 , the same without the 1 + γκ factor. The values of (1 − µ)−1 have been
computed for different families of functions in previous work. To provide some examples, it is equal to 4/3 for affine
latency functions, and approximately equal to 1.626, 1.896, and 2.151 for quadratic, cubic, and quartic polynomial
latency functions, respectively. On the other hand, for unrestricted functions this value is infinite so the bound becomes
vacuous in that case, which provides support for the topological analysis of Section 3.
To evaluate the tightness of our upper bounds, we now propose lower bounds for the PRA. More specifically, we
provide a family of instances indexed by i whose latency functions are (1, µi)-smooth, for µi = 1 − 2−i, for which
the bound is approximately tight. These instances imply lower bounds equal to 1 + γκ(1 − µi)−1 = 1 + γκ2i. A
few remarks are in order. First, notice that although the lower and upper bounds do not match, they are similar. The
difference is whether the 1 is or is not multiplied by the µ factor. When the γκ term is large, both bounds are essentially
equal. Second, notice that for large values of i, necessarily the number of alternations of the longest alternating path
must grow exponentially large to simultaneously match the structural upper bound presented in Theorem 1.
Theorem 5. For any i > 0, letting µi = 1 − 2−i, PRA ≥ 1 + γκ(1 − µi)−1 for the family of instances satisfying
the (1, µi)-smoothness property.
To get the result we use the recursive construction of Theorem 2 but with cost functions satisfying the (1, µi)-
smoothness condition around the RAWE. For the given i, we construct a graphGi that implies that PRA ≥ 1+γκ2i =
1+γκ(1−µi)−1 . A brief roadmap of the proof is as follows. We specify the instance, and determine the RNWE flow
z and the RAWE flow x with their costs. From there, we conclude that PRA ≥ 1 + γκ(1− µi)−1. Finally, we prove
that `e is (1, µi)-smooth around xe for all e.
Proof. We consider the graph Gi constructed in Theorem 2 with riA = r
i
N = 1 (see Fig. 1 and 2) but with alternative
functions aj(·). For the functions defined at level 1 ≤ j ≤ i, we set aj(x) = 0 for x ≤ 2j−1/2i whereas for larger x,
aj(x) increases linearly to attain 2j−1γκ at x = 2
j−1
2i−1 . Mathematically,
aj(x) = max
{
0,
2j−1γκ
2j−1
2i−1 − 2
j−1
2i
(
x− 2
j−1
2i
)}
.
To simplify notation, we refer to edges that have cost function aj(·) as aj . Figure 3 illustrates the construction
for i = 2 and i = 3. As an example, we specify the resulting mean latency functions for i = 2: a1 is such that
a1(
1
4 ) = 0 and a1(
1
3 ) = γκ, and a2 satisfies a2(
1
2 ) = 0 and a2(
2
3 ) = 2γκ. The RNWE flow splits the unit flow
equally along the 4 paths not containing any vertical edge. Instead, the RAWE flow splits the unit flow equally along
the 3 paths that contain a vertical edge. Evaluating those functions, aj(z) = 0 and aj(x) = 2j−1γκ, from where
PRA ≥ C(x)/C(z) = (1 + 4γκ)/1 = 1 + 4γκ for the family of functions that are (1, 3/4)-smooth.
We refer to paths in Gi not containing any vertical edge in representations such as that of Fig. 3 as parallel paths.
The rest of the paths, containing a single vertical edge, are referred to as zig-zag paths. It is not hard to see using an
inductive proof on the construction of Gi that there are 2i parallel paths and there are 2i − 1 zig-zag paths.
Generalizing what we saw in the example for i = 2, the RNWE flow z splits the unit flow equally along the 2i
parallel paths. To verify that z is at equilibrium, observe that for each aj edge, for 1 ≤ j ≤ i, there are 2j−1 parallel
paths passing through it. Consequently, each aj will get 2j−1/2i units of flow, implying that their costs are 0. Path
costs under z are thus the same as those in Theorem 2, which implies that z is indeed a RNWE and that C(z) = 1.
On the other hand, the RAWE flow x splits the unit flow equally along the 2i − 1 zig-zag paths. To verify that
x is at equilibrium, observe that for each aj edge, for 1 ≤ j ≤ i, there are 2j−1 zig-zag paths passing through it.
Consequently, each aj will get 2j−1/(2i − 1) units of flow, implying that their costs are 2j−1γκ. Path costs under x
are thus the same as those in Theorem 2, which implies that x is indeed the RAWE and that C(x) = 1 + 2iγκ. From
there, the bound for PRA in the statement of the theorem follows.
What remains to be shown is that for any chosen Gi, functions aj are (1, µi)-smooth around xj , where xj =
2j−1/(2i − 1) is the RAWE flow at edge aj . The other cost functions are constant so they trivially satisfy the smooth-
ness properties. To prove this, let us consider 1 ≤ j ≤ i. From the definition of smoothness we need to show that
yaj(xj) ≤ yaj(y) + µixjaj(xj) for all y ∈ R≥0. Equivalently, we can show that
1− 2−i = µi ≥
maxy∈R≥0 y(aj(xj)− aj(y))
xjaj(xj)
.
First, note that the maximum is attained in the interval [2j−1/2i, xj ] since aj(y) = 0 to the left of the interval, and
the argument of the maximum becomes negative to the right. Since aj is linear in that interval, we solve the maximum
problem by extending it linearly to the whole domain. Since additive constants are irrelevant because we maximize the
difference of aj evaluated in two points, we modify the linearized function and add a constant so it evaluates to 0 at 0.
For linear functions that cross the origin, the maximizer of the problem is xj/2 [7]. Because xj/2 is to the left of the
interval where the maximizer must be, the maximizer with respect to aj is y∗ = 2j−1/2i and aj(y∗) = 0. From there,
maxy∈R≥0 y(aj(xj)− aj(y))
xjaj(xj)
=
y∗
xj
=
2j−1
2i
2j−1
2i−1
=
2i − 1
2i
= µi .
uunionsq
5 The Mean-Standard Deviation Model
In this section, we turn to the mean-standard deviation model and prove upper and lower structural bounds on PRA,
now assuming that κ is the maximum among edges of the coefficient of variationCVe(fe), defined as the ratio between
the standard deviation and the mean. The lower bounds follow from the same instances that were used to prove the
lower bounds in the mean-variance case in Section 3. Considering families of graphs with up to η forward disjoint
subpaths and general mean latency and standard deviation functions, we prove upper bounds for the cases η = {1, 2},
and lower bounds for arbitrary η. For η ≤ 2, both bounds are valid and coincide, so this analysis characterizes the
PRA for the standard deviation case exactly.
Since we are now dealing with standard deviations, we redefine Qγp(f) = `p(f) + γσp(f), where σp(f) =
(
∑
e∈p σ
2
e(fe))
1/2. Given an instance based on a graph G, we refer to a RNWE flow by z and to a RAWE flow by y.
Further, we denote the (constant) path cost perceived by players at the RAWE y by Qγ(y) and the (constant) expected
latencies perceived by players at the RNWE z by Q0(z). The definition for the price of risk aversion is analogous to
that given in Section 2.
Our first result provides inequalities that relate the social cost at equilibrium with the perceived utilities. The first
part is known and the second is an easy generalization.
Proposition 1. For an arbitrary instance, C(z) = dQ0(z) and C(y) ≤ dQγ(y), where d is the traffic demand.
Proof. Using that at equilibria all used paths have equal path costs, we get:
1. C(z) =
∑
p∈P zp`p(z) = dQ
0(z)
2. C(y) =
∑
p∈P yp`p(y) ≤
∑
p∈P yp(`p(y) + γσp(y)) = dQ
γ(y). uunionsq
Fig. 4. A1-B1-A2 is an alternating path with 2 disjoint forward subpaths.
As in Section 3, we partition the edge-set E into two: A = {e ∈ E : ye < ze} and B = {e ∈ E : ze ≤ ye}.
We assume that all edges in E are used either by either flow y or z. This is without loss of generality because unused
edges can be deleted without any consequence. The definition of A implies that ze > 0 for all e ∈ A, while the
assumption implies that ye > 0 for all e ∈ B. To prove an upper bound on PRA, we rely again on alternating paths.
By Lemma 4.5 of [14], we know that an alternating path must always exist. The next result specifies that when the
alternating path is simple (i.e., it is an actual s-t path), then the PRA is low. This result, which is related to the result
for series-parallel graphs in [16], sets the stage for the more ambitious result below.
Lemma 1. Considering the set of instances on general topologies with arbitrary mean latency and standard deviation
functions that admit alternating paths that are (actual) paths (i.e., 0 alternations), PRA ≤ 1 + γκ.
Proof. We let pi be an alternating path consisting of just arcs in A (i.e., it is an actual s-t path). Let p be any used
path under the RAWE y. Using the equilibrium conditions, the relationship between 1-norms and 2-norms, and the
coefficient of variation bound κ,
Qγ(y) ≤
∑
e∈p
`e(y) + γ
√∑
e∈p
σ2e(y) ≤
∑
e∈pi
`e(y) + γ
√∑
e∈pi
σ2e(y) ≤ (1 + γκ)
∑
e∈pi
`e(y).
Using the monotonicity of the mean latency functions, `e(y) ≤ `e(z) for e ∈ pi, from where Qγ(y) ≤ (1 +
γκ)
∑
e∈pi `e(z). Since ze > 0 for all e ∈ pi because of the property stated earlier, a flow decomposition can
be found where pi is used under the RNWE z, implying that C(z) = d
∑
e∈pi `e(z). Finally, using Proposition 1,
C(y) ≤ dQγ(y) ≤ d(1 + γκ)∑e∈pi `e(z) = (1 + γκ)C(z), from where we get the bound on PRA. uunionsq
We now generalize the result for Braess graphs given in [16] to general graphs that admit alternating paths with a
single alternation.
Lemma 2. Considering the set of instances on general topologies with arbitrary mean latency and standard deviation
functions that admit alternating paths with 2 disjoint forward subpaths, PRA ≤ 1 + 2γκ.
Proof. We let pi = A1-B1-A2 be the alternating path with 2 disjoint forward subpaths A1 and A2, and reverse subpath
B1, where these subpaths belong to A or B correspondingly. Figure 4 illustrates the topology of these subpaths.
Consider a RAWE flow y and a flow-carrying path C1-B1-D1 under y. Such a path must exist because edges in B1
carry flow under y as it was mentioned earlier. Using the equilibrium conditions for y,
`C1(y) + `B1(y) + `D1(y) + γ
√
σ2C1(y) + σ
2
B1
(y) + σ2D1(y) ≤ `A1(y) + `D1(y) + γ
√
σ2A1(y) + σ
2
D1
(y). (3)
Let us first assume that σ2C1(y) + σ
2
B1
(y) + σ2D1(y) ≤ σ2A1(y) + σ2D1(y). For α ≤ β and δ ≥ 0, it can be proved that√
β + δ −√α+ δ ≤ √β −√α. Letting α = σ2C1(y) + σ2B1(y), β = σ2A1(y), and δ = σ2D1(y), (3) implies that
`C1(y) + `B1(y) + γ
√
σ2C1(y) + σ
2
B1
(y) ≤ `A1(y) + γ
√
σ2A1(y) ≤ (1 + γκ)`A1(y). (4)
If σ2C1(y) + σ
2
B1
(y) + σ2D1(y) > σ
2
A1
(y) + σ2D1(y), (3) implies that `C1(y) + `B1(y) ≤ `A1(y), from where
`C1(y) + `B1(y) + γ
√
σ2C1(y) + σ
2
B1
(y) ≤ (1 + γκ)(`C1(y) + `B1(y)) ≤ (1 + γκ)`A1(y).
Fig. 5. (a) The Braess graph. (b) The domino-with-ears graph. (c) A graph admitting an alternating path with η+1 disjoint forward
subpaths.
Hence, in both cases the same inequality holds. Using a similar argument for the path C1-A2 instead of A1-D1, we get
`D1(y) + `B1(y) + γ(σ
2
D1
(y) + σ2B1(y))
1/2 ≤ (1 + γκ)`A2(y). From the monotonicity of the square root, we further
derive that
`D1(y) + γσD1(y) ≤ `D1(y) + γ
√
σ2D1(y) + σ
2
B1
(y) ≤ (1 + γκ)`A2(y)− `B1(y). (5)
Since the path is used under y, Qγ(y) = `C1(y) + `B1(y) + `D1(y) + γ(σ
2
C1
(y) + σ2B1(y) + σ
2
D1
(y))1/2. Using again
the norm-1, norm-2 inequality, together with (4) and (5), and the definitions of A and B, we can upper bound the
previous expression with
`C1(y) + `B1(y) + `D1(y) + γ
√
σ2C1(y) + σ
2
B1
(y) + γσD1(y) ≤ (1 + γκ)(`A1(y) + `A2(y))− `B1(y)
≤ (1 + γκ)(`A1(z) + `A2(z))− `B1(z). (6)
Now we derive a related bound for the RNWE flow z. For a potentially different D1, the path A1-D1 must carry
flow under z. Such a path must exist because ze > 0 for e ∈ A1. Furthermore, by the equilibrium conditions for
z applied to path A2, which also carries flow under z, `A2(z) ≤ `B1(z) + `D1(z). Putting both remarks together,
Q0(z) = `A1(z) + `D1(z) ≥ `A1(z) + `A2(z) − `B1(z). Combining the last inequality with (6), and the fact that
Q0(z) is an upper bound for both `A1(z) and `A2(z), we get
Qγ(y) ≤ Q0(z) + γκ(`A1(z) + `A2(z)) ≤ (1 + 2γκ)Q0(z).
That implies the result since Proposition 1 yields C(y) ≤ dQγ(y) ≤ d(1 + 2γκ)Q0(z) = (1 + 2γκ)C(z). uunionsq
Lemma 1 implies that series-parallel graphs satisfy that PRA ≤ 1 + γκ [16] and it is well know that those graphs
can be characterized as not containing the Braess graph. Along that line, we provide a forbidden minor characterization
of Lemma 2: the topology of instances for which PRA ≤ 1 + 2γκ is characterized by graphs not containing the
domino-with-ears graph as a minor. This graph is defined as a domino graph [3] with two arcs joining the respective
pair of vertices at distance 2. The result extends one in [16] that establishes that PRA ≤ 1+2γκ for the Braess graph.
Figure 5 depicts the forbidden graphs associated with the previous two lemmas. As a quick checkup of our results, note
that the domino-with-ears graph contains the Braess graph as a minor so it cannot belong to the family of instances
for which PRA ≤ 1 + γκ. Indeed, contracting the lower-left and upper-right vertical edges in the domino-with-ears
graph produces the Braess graph.
Theorem 6. Considering the set of instances on general topologies with arbitrary mean latency and standard devia-
tion functions that do not have domino-with-ears as a minor, PRA ≤ 1 + 2γκ.
Proof. To reach a contradiction, assume the equilibria of an instance not containing a domino-with-ears graph as a
minor satisfy that C(x) > C(y)(1 + 2γκ). Since an alternating path must exist [16], by Lemmas 1 and 2, it must
have strictly more than 2 disjoint forward subpaths. Let us denote the alternating path by A1-B1-A2-. . .-Bη-Aη+1
as indicated in Fig. 5(c), for η ≥ 2. For each i, a path Ci-Bi-Di must exist because Bi is a flow-carrying subpath
under the flow y. By deleting all vertices not belonging to Ai, Bi, Ci or Di, deleting all edges in C3, . . . , Cη and
D4, . . . , Dη , contracting the subpath D3 so its tail and head become a single vertex, and contracting all edges of each
of the subpaths C1, C2, D1, D2, A1, A2, A3, B1, B2 into a single edge, we obtain the domino-with-ears graph. This is
a contradiction to the assumption that the domino-with-ears graph was not a minor. uunionsq
The previous proof implies that any graph that has the domino-with-ears graph as a minor cannot belong to the
family of instances for which PRA ≤ 1 + 2γκ. Lemma 1 and Theorem 6 together imply that PRA ≤ 1 + ηγκ holds
for the set of instances admitting alternating paths in which the number of disjoint forward subpaths is not more than
η, for η ≤ 2. Although this does not fully generalize Theorem 1 to the case of standard deviations, it a first step in that
direction.
To provide matching lower bounds for the results of this section, we note that all paths in the proof of Theorem 2
have at most one edge with nonzero variance. For this reason, all the lower bounds in Section 3 work by reinterpreting
the variances as standard deviations and the variance-to-mean ratios as coefficients of variation. In summary, we can
copy the lower bound elements of Corollaries 1 and Theorem 3 to have the results for the standard deviation case.
Corollary 2. The upper bounds PRA ≤ 1+γκ and PRA ≤ 1+2γκ corresponding to graphs that admit alternating
paths with 1 and 2 disjoint forward subpaths, respectively, are tight.
6 Conclusion
We have considered the effect of risk averse players on selfish routing with stochastic travel times, captured by mean
and variance functions of flow, following the mean-var and mean-stdev risk models in Nikolova and Stier-Moses [16].
Our main conceptual contribution is a new perspective and understanding of efficiency loss due to risk-averse behav-
ior in terms of topological versus functional measures, the first one depending on the topology of the network and
independent of the expected latency functions, and the second depending on the class of allowed latency functions and
independent of the network topology, similarly to previous price of anarchy analysis. Our main technical contribution
is the inductive construction of a family of graphs that can be adapted with appropriate mean and variance functions to
yield both topological and functional lower bounds. We also show how to generalize previous price of anarchy analysis
for deterministic congestion games based on variational inequalities [7] to provide a functional upper bound here. Our
results may in turn inspire a re-investigation of the classic price of anarchy results in deterministic settings through the
lens of the topological analysis.
We are just at the start of understanding and characterizing the effect of risk-averse player preferences on network
equilibria. This work opens the way to multiple new research directions, including investigating alternative risk models,
heterogeneous players and multiple demands. A key challenge is to develop a better understanding and technical
approaches to non-additive risk-models, such as the mean-stdev model, which have so far resisted fully general upper
bound analysis for arbitrary graphs—a step in that direction is our third technical contribution on the mean-stdev model
for a family of graphs that contain and generalize series-parallel graphs and the Braess graphs. Moreover, although the
construction used for the various lower bounds can also provide functional lower bounds for the standard deviation
case, functional upper bounds for the standard deviation case so far remain elusive and will be the subject of future
research.
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